Book review: The Great Gamble, the Soviet War in Afghanistan
Written by admin on December 10th, 2009By Gregory Feifer
Reviewed by Steven R. Maher
As President Barack Obama anguishes over whether to increase the U.S. troop level in Afghanistan, Gregory Feifer has written a timely book about the Russian invasion, occupation, and ultimately defeat in Afghanistan. It was the historical epoch out of which today’s tragedy grew. It makes for disturbing reading.
Familiar pattern
The story begins in 1979 when an aging Soviet Politburo decided in a brief meeting to invade Afghanistan. There was a belief by the Russians that the war would be over quickly and Soviet forces would be withdrawn after a few months. Feifer draws many parallels between this decision and George W. Bush’s 2003 decision to invade Iraq. Bush too had the expectation that the Iraq war would be over quickly, and American forces would be withdrawn after a few months.
What makes this book different is that the author strove to tell the story from both sides. He interviewed Russian soldiers, so we see how the war played out from their perspective. Many young Russians idealistically arrived in Afghanistan believing they were fulfilling their “internationalist” duty as Marxists to help a backward country and impoverished people. They were quickly disabused of such innocence as they soon found themselves patronizing, plundering, and ultimately massacring the Afghans they had come to help.
The Soviet Army was not the technically advanced monolith it was believed to be. Some of their weaponry and even food was of World War II vintage. “Supplies of heating fuel, wood, and food remained scare on some bases,” writes Feifer. “And free distribution of hashish and heroin by locals would encourage widespread drug use, which often turned the routine hazing of fresh conscripts more malicious.”
What the Soviets lacked in supplies they made up with ferocity. Their gun ships had control of the air, which they used to mercilessly slaughter the Afghan population.
“Roughly 1.3 million Afghans were believed to have been killed,” continues Feifer. “A third of the pre-war population off 5.5 million had fled abroad and another 2 million were internally displaced.”
Turning point
The turning point of the war took place in September 1986 when the U.S. supplied Stinger anti-aircraft missiles to the mujahideen, the Afghan resistance. Within three years the Soviets withdrew, their puppet government was overthrown, and the leading Communist was executed.
The Americans and Russians washed their hands of Afghanistan, and the country descended into chaos as the guerrillas who fought the Soviets made war on each other. Out of the wreckage the Taliban emerged, followed by Al-Qaeda and 9-11.
As the reader goes through this book, a queasy feeling develops as Feifer describes how the Russians alienated the Afghans by showing disregard for their culture and mores. The author points out similar episodes after the American invasion, and says that excessive U.S. bombings, with their concomitant deaths to civilian noncombatants, have turned many Afghans into Taliban sympathizers.
It’s a well-organized book, broken into readable little segments. If you’re the type of person who reads a book over a period of days as time permits, and you enjoy history, you’ll find this a text well worth reading.



















